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Let Us Drink Our Fill: The History of
Water and Its Impact on Resource and
Environmental Management
Victor B. Flatt*
Jim Salzman's Thirst. A Short History of Drinking Water' tells a
remarkable story about how we have managed one of the most important
substances in our lives, and through its historical tales, may also point to a
way to think not only about water management, but also about the
management of all kinds of resources-a management strategy that is not
defined by the resource, but instead, the resource's ultimate use.
Up until this time, those who study environmental pollution have
generally focused on resource management (and in this I include resources
that can be despoiled by pollution, such as clean air) based on the resource
itself, i.e. how should we best manage water, or air, or animals, or land
generally. With many of these natural resources, management strategies
have been driven by concerns of common overuse-the tragedy of the
commons.
2
Thus, much of the legal analysis of resource use has focused on how to
correct the commons problem so that we all get appropriate economic
signals to avoid overuse. In the environmental law arena, the market's
failure to internalize costs, which results in the tragedy of the commons, is
given as the main justification for government intervention into the private
marketplace-we have to control how much pollution one can put into the
commons because the polluters have no incentive to do so themselves. We
have to choose the best management strategy to correct this market
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1. See James Salzman, Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 94
(2006).
2. Carol Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common
Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1991) [hereinafter Rose, Rethinking].
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problem. Many of us have grappled with theories of which kind of
intervention would best correct the overuse of resources. One of the most
important contributors to this field is Professor Carol Rose, who has
analyzed various methods of pollution-control strategies and drew
conclusions about intervention choice based on the overall pressure faced
by a resource.3 Importantly, she focused us not just on the effect a strategy
would have on the resource itself, but its costs for the regulated
community and costs for the government to enforce the strategy.4
From the work that built on this insight and its application to the real
world (i.e. when should market strategies be used as pollution control
mechanisms), we have been able to see that management strategy
"effectiveness" is not the only issue that is of concern. Important work on
control strategies for resources has thrown a spotlight on a far more
fundamental question: Is correcting the market mechanism the only
question that we need to ask when we decide how we should regulate our
natural resources? Or do other issues exist as well? In particular, I have
focused on the question of whether we should have a right to certain
resources outside of our ability to turn the resources into property that we
can afford to keep. 5 And if we do have a right to certain resources, what is
the intellectual or philosophical justification for that right?6
Professor Rose, whom we honor in this symposium, has always looked
beyond economic efficiency in her work. Because of this, Professor
Salzman's paper is both a wonderful contribution in its own right as well
as an extension of Professor Rose's own work. Professor Salzman
explores the history of drinking water to help answer one of the important
questions posed by the privatization and re-publicization of drinking water
in Cochabamba, Bolivia: who should have access to drinking water and
why? I think answering the questions of "who?" and "why?" will be
necessary in order to address all future resource and environmental
problems. Optimal regulatory strategies may change depending on the cost
of goods and technology,7 or they may conflict with each other.8 They
may also suffer from inherent problems in their diffuse nature and in the
asymmetry of political pressures.9 But if we ground our regulation of
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See generally Victor B. Flatt, This Land Is Your Land (Our Right to the Environment), 107 W.
VA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2005).
6. Others reach the same rights question through analyzing regulatory mechanisms and noting
that these mechanisms determine rights. See Daniel Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information
Age, 79 N.Y.U.L. REV. 115, 117, 136 (2004).
7. Daniel Esty, Next Generation of Environmental Law: A Response to Richard Stewart, 29 CAP.
U.L. REV. 183, 190 (2001).
8. J.B. Ruhl & Jim Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in
the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003).
9. Richard Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 201, 208 (2004).
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resources and the environment in principles of who, if anyone, has
entitlements to them,, we can preserve access to a resource as a basic
human right, even as implementation inputs change.' ° Poorly defined
rights do not benefit society overall," and being clear about these
questions can help us avoid the use of technological or method debates to
hide values debates.'
2
Both Professors Salzman and Rose recognize the importance of history
in helping us answer these questions.' 3 To the extent that circumstances
are similar, patterns of resource use, and indeed laws in general, that have
been tested in the crucible of history may suggest the most successful way
to address a particular problem or issue.14 It is on this basis that I have
recently asserted that a right to certain resources and to freedom from
pollution exists in statutory law because it replicates common law
entitlements.' 5 Professor Salzman's examination of past water use
supports the idea of a "right" to basic environmental resources and
illustrates a way to successfully manage this right.
I think the tentative conclusion that Professor Salzman draws from the
case histories of drinking water is correct-that water should not
necessarily be managed as either a private commodity or a public right,
but sometimes as both.'6 But this excellent analysis, I believe, provides a
different way of coming to the same conclusion about water and a new
key to helping us understand how best to address resource use and
environmental amenities in general. Though I cannot examine all of the
ramifications and applications of this theory in this symposium paper, I
would like to explain my thesis and illustrate why I think it may be very
valuable.
The case histories set out in Professor Salzman's paper definitely
demonstrate for water (and I would assert other resources) that questions
of entitlement and management may depend not on the nature of the
resource itself, but instead on the use to which the resource is being put. In
other words, we should think about water based not on the total amount of
the resource itself, but on whether water is used for drinking and survival
or used as a market input. In effect, we might be talking about two
different resources, albeit ones that are physically identical. Professor
Salzman alludes to this distinction in discussing the nature and history of
10. Esty, supra note 7.
11. Jim Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services, 80 N.Y.U.L. REV. 870, 930 (2005).
12. See generally Victor B. Flatt, Saving the Lost Sheep (Bringing Environmental Values Back
into the Fold with a New E.P.A. Decisionmaking Paradigm), 74 WASH. L. REV. I (1999).
13. Carol Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creations, 66 SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89,
99 (2003) [hereinafter Rose, Romans].
14. See generally Flatt, supra note 5, at 10.
15. Id.
16. Salzman, supra note 1, at 119.
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water, and I think it deserves to be discussed further. 7
In the historical examples cited by Professor Salzman, when water is
used for drinking or directly for human survival, access is universal, from
the Right of Thirst in Jewish and Islamic law, to access in ancient India to
East Africa.18 Even when water was dealt with differently, for instance
when it was treated as a commodity in Ancient Rome, there was still free
access to water for drinking. 9 From our current way of viewing resources,
we might think this surprising since we know that water is a scarce
resource, and economic theory would suggest that we must manage it as
such-without giving free access. However, if we recognize drinking
water as different from water, we see that we can both acknowledge
drinking water's special status as a human right and still understand how
water in general can be managed to avoid the tragedy of the commons.
This is the beauty of history. Without ever having to consciously
acknowledge theories such as "rights" or "economic overuse theory,"
historic customary and legal systems both acknowledged and respected
rights and entitlements, and did so in a way that was consistent with
modem economics' theories of selfish human behavior. I believe that the
concept of distinguishing resource control based on the resource's use is
an idea that society would do well to implement for all resources, and
Professor Salzman's work on water proves this more robustly than what I
have been able to do through an examination of the development of
common law.20 Let us examine how water illustrates this principle so well.
If we think about the nature of resources pressured by overuse, the fact
that there can be universal right to access drinking water should come as
no surprise. To the extent that water is only used for drinking, it is not
under any particular pressure from overuse; and in such a situation, as
noted by Professor Rose, the most logical way to deal with the resource is
to "do nothing., 21 In terms of availability for drinking, global freshwater
supplies have historically always been sufficient.22 Human beings would
only settle in areas in which drinking water could be secured. Otherwise,
they would leave. If water supplies dried up, humans would either have
brought more in, or more likely have already left, since the ecosystem,
which depends upon water, would have become hostile. Even today, as we
discuss human habitation on the moon or Mars, we talk about the need for
a water supply-rarely is it discussed as an amount of water. If it exists,
17. Id.
18. Id. at99-103.
19. Id. at 104.
20. See generally, Flatt, supra note 5, at 11-19.
21. Rose, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 15.
22. Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEXAs L. REV. 1873, 1896




Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol18/iss3/7
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
there should be enough drinking water for human consumption, period.
Because the truth is, in terms of base survival, humans do not need or use
that much drinking water. If humans are settled in appropriate places,
there is obviously enough drinking water on earth for 6 billion or 50
billion humans.23 Nor do we ever have to worry about a problem of
overuse of water that is for drinking, for humans cannot "overdrink"
water, in the same way that their cattle or sheep can overgraze the
common field. One human can only hold so much water, and there are far
more immediate limiting controls on population, such as food; it is the
limiting resources that we have to worry about, not water.
I do realize that as a practical matter, there are many important caveats
to this assertion. For one, we know that there are currently many people in
the world who live in areas that do not have clean water, but water from
which they might contract disease. But this issue is not really the
availability of water that could be used for drinking, but the overuse of
water for waste disposal, whether human or industrial.
It is also fair to assert that water purely for drinking does not perhaps
encompass all of the water uses necessary for human survival, or certainly
not all uses desirable for human life. Many of us depend on water to carry
away wastes, and obviously water is necessary for all of the agriculture
and animal husbandry that provides our food. But I do not think any of
these facts detracts from the focal point about the relative abundance of
drinking water compared to water for other uses. In other words, if we
corrected the commons problem by making water an economic
commodity for non-drinking purposes (as a cheap way to dispose of waste
for instance or to provide food), we would not have a shortage of water for
everyone to drink. Though these other uses may be important to humans
(as food is), they essentially are economic inputs into production, and even
the availability of food in its modem sense (indeed since the introduction
of agriculture at all), is subject to the same rules of availability as any
other commodity. Historically, humans have never had universal access to
enough food; instead, human population growth has been limited by this
commodity, just as it has limited population growth for most animals.
24
There can also be artificial constraints. Drinking water availability could
be (and has been) used as a tool in warfare or for political manipulation,
but these constraints do not alter the basic argument that there is plenty of
drinking water to support the entire human population.
So at least when used for drinking, water can be available to all without
23. Id.
24. It should be noted that though, historically, humans have only located where there is access to
drinking water, in the modem era, people may locate where water can be brought in. It may be brought
in because it is a commodity. Nevertheless, this does not change the historical treatment of water for
drinking as a right vs. water in general as a commodity.
[Supp.: 122
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exhausting the resource. This is an important observation indeed. If
generalizable to other resources, it seems that if we respect history we
really are in the best of all possible worlds, with respect to recognizing
rights and having systems in place that can allow for the recognition of
those rights without imperiling the survival of the species as a whole. We
are not going to "overgraze" the commons that is necessary for the
flourishing of the human species. This should not surprise anyone. In
biological evolution (and in certain theories of cosmological evolution), it
is a truism that anything necessary for survival will be present for those
species that have survived. Over long enough time spans, the same holds
true for legal systems.25 Just as species' survival depends on biological
laws, so does societal survival depend on human behavior norms. The
attempt to channel or control those norms is reflected in legal evolution.26
Moreover, additional positive effects of water as a right have also evolved.
As Professor Rose has noted, a plentiful resource may foster beneficial
relationships that can serve other collateral functions.2 7 Water is just one
kind of available good that can help bridge distrust between cultures.
28
Relationships formed from abundance should not be discounted, and water
is the sine qua non of this principle.
The fact that there are overuse and shortages of water that is not used
for drinking necessarily implies that water for other uses should not be
treated as a right, but instead be priced as a commodity. Professor
Salzman's history supports this distinction, which also fits our societal
needs and wants. Under ancient Jewish and Islamic law, strangers were
only allowed water if necessary for immediate survival.29 Other uses of
water for those outside the "limited commons property" (as Professor
Rose would call it) were priced more as commodities or managed as a
resource where only certain people had access.30
So one conclusion that we can draw from Professor Salzman's historical
examples is that we have an historic right to drinking water, but not
necessarily an historic right to water for other uses (including agriculture
and animal husbandry), at least when the resource is threatened by
overuse. So, if we wish to use these historic lessons for modem times, we
would want to have systems whereby drinking water (and perhaps small
25. Flatt, supra note 5, at 10.
26. Id.
27. Carol Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission
Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REv. 129, 134 (1997) [hereinafter Rose, Futures].
28. The shared interest in a sport (which can be a form of resource that is not congested)
contributed to the U.S. "ping-pong" diplomacy with China in the early 1970s. Other cultures have
shared interests and rituals over water-related goods such as tea or coffee.
29. Salzman, supra note 1, at 100.
30. Within the local community all water was a commons, but it was property to outsiders, a form
of resource use discussed by Professor Rose. See Rose, Romans, supra note 13, at 107-08, and Rose,
Futures, supra note 27, at 131.
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amounts for other immediate human uses like bathing or cooking) would
be considered a right, while water for all other uses would be considered
property. Doing so would not interfere with universal access to drinking
water but would head off shortages of water that is used as a production
input. If we wanted people to use water for production effectively, that
would mean that we would need to "price" it appropriately.
The problem obviously comes in the practicality of this distinction, for
even if we wish people to have a right to water for drinking and no right,
but a requirement, to purchase water for other uses as a production input,
the fact remains that we are dealing with the same product, albeit for
different uses. Maintaining access for drinkers but not for other users may
not always be easy. But in fact, this does not necessarily have to be so.
History demonstrates again and again that as human behavior changed in
response to input and availability of resources, legal norms evolved to
preserve this differentiated access. This is illustrated by the Roman legal
systems Professor Salzman describes.3 '
You will recall that the Romans came up with a way to practice market
segmentation. They were able to provide water for drinking and small
scale home use (which could be considered a survival use), while at the
same time charging for that same water when it was used in ways not as
necessary to human survival.32 Let us examine how they did this. What
kept those who used water for other uses than "survival" from taking the
drinking supply from those who did? For logically, if some user has to pay
for water and another does not, the paying user would rather have the free
water and would have an incentive to try to take it.
In Rome, the market segmentation primarily occurred at the access
point. The water that was used primarily for drinking had at least two
characteristics that protected it from overuse. One, it was somewhat more
difficult to get than the same water that was sold to houses through the
piping system. Water at the fountain had to be gathered and moved. This
served as a wonderful way to segment the market. Water for drinking
could be gathered at a common fountain without too much difficulty
because the amounts needed were small. The more that a person wanted to
take (which would occur the more the water was used for anything beyond
mere survival or basic needs) the harder it would become to gather it. At
some point, the cost of carrying large amounts of water to use for things
other than survival (for private fountains and pools, irrigation, gardens,
continuous toilets, etc. . . .) would exceed the cost of getting the water
piped directly into the home.
Additionally, there was an effective enforcement mechanism. The
31. Salzman, supra note 1, at 103-06.
32. Id. at 104-05.
[Supp.: 122
7
Flatt: Let Us Drink Our Fill
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
2006]
fountains were public. Anyone could see who was using the water and
anyone would have an incentive to report overuse, which might occur, for
instance, if someone tried to put a piping .system into the fountain to carry
water to their home.
The same lesson is illustrated in the London and New York examples,
except in those cases no one had set up an effective system to discriminate
between the users so that those who did use water as a commodity would
pay for it, and subsidize the others. One could imagine that at some point
in time, both London and New York would have been (and in fact did
become) rich enough to have enough people willing to pay for water as
commodity (for industry, plumbing, pools, and vanity uses) that they
could have replicated a similar system as Rome. The fact that they did not
is probably because the government did not come up with a way to, or the
idea of, segmenting the market. Both cities had to slog through decades of
substandard water for all uses because the people who used water as a
commodity (such as for raw sewage and industry) were using it without
paying for it, thus creating shortages of clean water for drinking. Even
today, in modern developed cities, we still do not have the sublime market
segmentation for water that was practiced by the Romans. Instead, all
users tend to pay for water as commodity and right: commodity since we
pay for it at all, and right since this payment is subsidized by the
government.33 It is in fact the largest users that often pay less for water
because of certain volume discounts.34 However, this might not be a huge
problem in developed countries for the simple reason that all who have a
right to water can "afford" this pricing system. For the vast majority of the
population in developed countries, water is cheap enough to hardly be
noticed.35 For the truly poor, it is a rare developed location where clean
water is not available for drinking free of charge.
But the Rome, New York and London histories do still have important
lessons to teach about the provision of water in developing countries, and
indeed the provision of resources in general. If we wish a developing
location to have access to safe drinking water, history shows that the legal
regime must play a role. It needs to price water for some and not others,
and legally control access to produce the market segmentation that was
present in Rome. Large users (including those who use water as a
commons dump) must be required to pay for that use, either directly or by
regulation, forcing them not to use it for certain purposes (such as a waste
commons). This of course requires a functioning and effective
government.
33. Glennon, supra note 22, at 1883.
34. Salzman, supra note 1, at 94.
35. And where not, there is a tendency to push back against commodity users, such as the call for
California to require payment for agricultural water to reduce pressure or domestic uses.
Flatt
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Another important lesson from Rome that Professor Salzman noted is
that water as a commodity facilitated the availability of water as a right for
drinking.36 This may have to come into play if we are to retrofit our major
urban centers in developing countries with drinking water as a right. In the
Cochabamba example, charging higher rates to those hooked up to the
system (or some of those hooked up to the system) could have been used
to subsidize small amounts of water for domestic use for the poorest in the
area who had been buying water from private vendors. This might still
have been more inconvenient than having water delivered through pipes
directly, but better than an expensive and unreliable supply.
The rioting at Cochabamba may indicate that at least some of the users
who had water piped into their homes were very price sensitive, and this
points to the problem with subsidization without any way to pay for it (a
problem with many commodities).37 In our urbanized world, where people
have concentrated based on an assumption of water availability but where
not everyone can drill wells to get water for free, the ability to provide the
"water right" to all may be facilitated if there is enough demand for water
as commodity to subsidize the drinking use. I am not an expert on
urbanization or on government policies which have led to over-building
and improper price signals in certain areas, but it seems to me that this
could still provide a way to at least think about how to solve the water
problems in the developing world.
The history of water may provide lessons for more than just water use.
The same ideas about basing a resource's management and accessibility
on its use are generalizable to many resource and environmental issues.
Much of our pollution problem can be seen as the use of one resource (air
or water) for both survival and natural amenities and for commodity use.
Much as in the issue of drinking water, air for survival cannot be
overused. No amount of persons we can anticipate could possibly impact
the provision of clean air for all simply by breathing the air. However,
those who use air as a commodity can have such an impact. One factory
on the edge of town might use so much air (to dispose of waste) that it
prevents one million people from breathing properly. Professor Salzman
himself has been one of the leading commentators on the importance of
valuing ecosystem services, and they too could be addressed by this
analysis.38 Natural systems doing their natural jobs of purification and
provision of benefits (which have been sublimely tuned over time) are
generally not in danger of overuse. But when harvested as commodities
(for waste or products), they can be overused and may need to be thought
36. Salzman, supra note 1, at 104-05.
37. Robert Glennon explores the variables of Cochabamba more explicitly in his article on water
scarcity. See Glennon, supra note 22, at 1891.
38. Salzman, supra note 11.
[Supp.: 122
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of as a property commodity.
Such a way of thinking about clean air and clean water and other
resources is consistent with the history that Professor Salzman has
outlined and others have explored. If we believe that our history can
reflect social goods,39 this provides another path to answering the question
that we have begun to ask: do we have a right to environmental amenities?
This is a post-economics way of thinking about the environment in that it
rejects the notion that all statutory environmental intervention is about
creating a system in which the environment is property so as to avoid the
tragedy of the commons. Instead it more broadly posits that statutory law
may be necessary to mimic what the common law itself has done, which is
to not only create and protect a property system, but also to create a
system of values and rights which respect human behavioral norms. As I
have noted in an earlier paper, this also has implications for how these
statutes should be administered and Professor Salzman's history points up
the same lesson.4°
While I do not have time in this comment to flesh out all of the
implications of treating environmental amenities as "right" or "property"
depending on use, we can touch on some of them. For instance, as is the
case with water, environmental amenities with a dual nature must be
managed in ways that allow for use (or user) discrimination. Without
considering other values at the moment, those that are using the air for
basic human necessity such as breathing must have free access to clean
air, while those that use it as a commodity cannot interfere with that right,
and must also then pay for any way that they use the air to avoid over-
consumption (since we already know that it is a congested resource). How
would we do that? Well it would most certainly mean that people who use
air for a commodity must be forced to curtail their use to the extent that it
infringes on the air as right requirement, and that they should be the ones
to pay for that determination. This means that the polluter should pay for
use, for monitoring of that use, and for any harm that use causes, and
should not necessarily have a vested right (or grandfathered right) in air
use if it interferes with the air as right. Thus, the principle could be a
powerful counterweight to pollution sources' lobbying which continues to
argue for being treated more "fairly," and for the government and the
public to shoulder some of the burden of their pollution, either in
administration or the cost of pollution itself.41 As noted by Richard
Lazarus, the political forces for and against environmental protection are
not balanced, and if we rethought environmental protection as a system of
39. Flatt, supra note 5, at 10.
40. Id. at 31-41.
41. Esty, supra note 6.
Flatt
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balancing rights versus infringement of those rights for commodity use, it
might take much of environmental law out of the political arena, and put it
in the hands of judges, who, Professor Lazarus has suggested, are better at
dealing with environmental issues.42
Putting the cost of management on polluters may also argue against a
"property system" for environmental regulation because of such a
system's high administrative costs, which would be borne by the people.
A property system could respect this right if it could be set up so that the
costs of administration were borne by the polluters. Recognizing a right to
the survival use of a resource would also favor process controls or
command and control over market controls for the same reason informing
the Roman water system. It is easier to see the cheating in such a system
and provides the appropriate incentive not to use air that is meant for
breathing.43 As pointed out by both Professor Rose and Professor Esty,
such regulatory systems that can cheaply distinguish between resource
users may get easier with better technology.'
This also provides another explanation for why control of point sources
of pollution is typically so much easier than non-point sources. Point
sources are like the people who want to tap into the fountains in Rome to
use water for commodity purposes-they are easily identified and
controlled.45 Non-point pollution is much more like a stealth user; it is
harder to trace.4 6 Non-point source controls have focused on land uses or
best practices and this may be one way to control use, but we need to think
more about how we can make non-point source pollution like point source
pollution for purposes of regulation-i.e. make it obvious and easily
deterable.47 Or there could be structural solutions. One example of this is
the use of moral suasion which Professor Rose recognized as an important
regulatory mechanism. 48 Just as the users of water at the Roman fountain
could chastise the people who wanted to put a private pipe into it to draw
the communal water away, people who see folks produce run-off that is
42. Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, supra note 9; Richard Lazarus, The Pragmatic
Ecologist: Environmental Protection as a Jurisdynamic Experience, 87 MINN. L. REv. 999, 1001
(2003). This theory may also be brought to bear on other seemingly complex questions of what is or is
not property. For instance, focusing on the use of something may allow a way of thinking about
cultural assets so we do not (as Professor Rose puts it) "throw the baby out with the bath water." Carol
Rose, Property in all the Wrong Places, 114 YALE L.J. 991, 993 (2005).
43. Although the easier it is to trace harms by making interference with the right visible, the more
we can move to different systems if they preserve the distinction between right and commodity. See
Esty, supra note 6, at 115.
44. Id.; Rose, Futures, supra note 27, at 138.
45. Victor B. Flatt, Spare the Rod and Spoil the Law: Why the Clean Water Act Has Never Grown
Up, 55 ALA. L. REv. 595 (2004).
46. Esty, supra note 6, at 162, 192.
47. Daniel Esty has correctly noted that technological improvements may make this analysis less
costly and more plausible. Id.
48. Rose, Rethinking, supra note 2 at 29.
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obviously bad or pour hazardous chemicals down the storm sewer might
be able to discourage those "commodifiers" by shaming.
But however it is accomplished, the most important principle may be
naming these individually human uses of environmental amenities as a
right. We seem to be moving in a direction away from this as many
environmental policy makers simply discuss all environmental amenities
for any uses, including drinking water, as a commodity. Professor
Salzman's history illustrates the workability of a strategy where,
depending on its ultimate use, we can designate some goods as freely
available to all while not overusing them, and the Cochabamba example
may represent the morality of that same strategy. Failure to recognize this
distinction so as to protect the provision of drinking water for all may not
only be morally problematic, but as our history shows, harmful to all.
Without entitlement to basic environmental values, we fail to protect the
person, which is necessary for wealth creation.4 9 As Professor Rose stated
in her close examination of how some rights and property regimes had
been ignored, "[S]ome of this pattern could easily be characterized as a
redistribution from producers to vandals, thieves, and freeloaders-hardly
an efficient outcome."5 Let us not get to the point described by Professor
Rose where individuals wanting basic human inputs, such as clean air and
clean water, are "deemed inappropriate to make claims of entitlement."51
49. Flatt, supra note 5, at 16.
50. Rose, Futures, supra note 27, at 143
51. Id. at 141.
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